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Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of the Greek
sovereign debt crisis that began in 2008, the
Greek shipping industry emerged as one of
the few bright spots in an otherwise troubled
economy. With most of its revenue stream com-
ing from abroad, Greek shipping was relatively
sheltered from the vagaries that befell other
domestic Greek industries in the face of national
insolvency. However, as the global financial cri-
sis dragged on, Greek shipping companies
encountered rough seas as increasingly strict
capital requirements forced banks to reduce
their lending exposure to shipping portfolios.
How and to what degree Greek shipping has
managed to weather this financial storm con-
cerns many observers. Focusing on commercial
shipping, this article evaluates efforts by the
Greek ship owners to remain competitive in the
face of the current financial crisis as well as
the changing nature of the global shipping
industry as a whole. This article begins by
exploring the importance of the Greek shipping
industry in the context of Greece’s national
economy and world shipping. Second, this arti-
cle examines the reasons for modernization of
the Greek fleet and the role of ship finance in
this process. The concluding section highlights
the future outlook of the industry, identifying
measures that stakeholders should take to
ensure continued competitiveness of Greek
shipping.
Why Greek Shipping Matters
Greece is a maritime nation with a long
tradition in ship owning. In early 2010, Greece
controlled the highest percentage of the world’s
tonnage (the measure of the size or cargo
carrying capacity of the ship) at 16.2 percent or
202 million deadweight tonnage (dwt). In com-
parison, Japan, Germany, and China control
15.8, 9.2, and 8.6 percent respectively (UNCTAD
2011, p. 43). It is important to specify that
the ships a company owns are considered
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Greek-controlled if the company is owned by
Greek interests, irrespective of the location of
the company’s headquarters and independent
of the flag under which the company’s ships are
registered. This definition of ownership is espe-
cially crucial considering that 68.3 percent of
the world tonnage is foreign-flagged (UNCTAD
2011, p. 45). So-called “flags of convenience”
may allow companies to escape stricter regula-
tions and higher taxes of their home registries,
one such tactic being the employment of for-
eign seafarers willing to work at lower wages.
In terms of nationally-flagged and beneficially-
owned1 tonnage, the Greeks own the world’s
largest fleet at 65 million dwt, followed by the
Chinese-owned (and flagged) fleet with 46 mil-
lion dwt. However, in terms of number of ves-
sels, Greece, with a total of 3213 ships, lags
behind Germany, Japan, and China, which indi-
cates that Greek ships carry greater tonnage on
average (UNCTAD 2011, p. 43). The difference
is in large part due to a Greek preference for
bulk carriers and tankers, which tend to be big-
ger than general cargo ships.
Greek shipping companies can be either
the principal owners or management companies
that operate the ships, whereby, in the latter
case, the effective owners are also those who
enjoy owner benefits independent of whose
name is on the title. For the most part, shipping
companies are established in countries that pro-
vide corporate and tax freedom, with both the
principal and the management company invari-
ably related to the same person or family
(Theotokas, p. 72). Greek-owned ships are man-
aged by companies of various sizes, with stan-
dard classifications of small (1–4 ships), medium
(5–15 ships), and large (16+ ships). The major-
ity of Greek shipping companies are pure trans-
porting companies concerned exclusively with
shipping. When ship owners invest in non-ship-
ping enterprises, the shipping companies gen-
erally devote the vast percentage of their time
to “preserving their characters as shipping
1Beneficial owners enjoy the benefits of ownership
when another name is on the title, sometimes held through
a shell corporation. Such a beneficial ownership retains legal
and financial responsibility for the ship and its activities.
Figure 1
95
entrepreneurs who only seek supplementary
profits from other industries” (Theotokas, p. 72). 
The shipping industry is Greece’s largest
export2, an interesting fact given that the coun-
try’s total contribution to world trade is mini-
mal relative to other countries with large ship-
owning interests such as Japan, China, and
Germany. George Gratsos, president of the
Piraeus-based Hellenic Chamber of Shipping,
notes that shipping accounts for 6 percent of the
Greek GDP while generating 75 percent of the
estimated 400,000 related jobs, which translates
to about 6 percent of total employment (“Mar-
itime Ties Help China, Greece . . .”). The broad
Greek shipping cluster includes owners and
operators of mostly bulk carriers and oil tankers;
providers of maritime services such as ship bro-
kers and agents, specialized legal services,
specialized finance, underwriters and maritime
insurance firms, port security operators; mar-
itime equipment suppliers; and maritime edu-
cation (Icaza et al., p. 16). The other 25 per-
cent of maritime industries include fisheries,
coastal shipping, port authorities, navy/coast
guard, and ship building/repair.
Ship owners and the merchant fleet help
the Greek economy in a number of ways. In
addition to the aforementioned employment in
the shipping industry and its domino effect
in related fields, the shipping industry is a
big contributor to the flow of foreign currency
into Greece, compensating for up to 31 percent
of Greece’s trade deficit in 2004 (“Greek Ship-
ping is Modernized”). Shipping income con-
verts into domestic consumption through
the wages and salaries of onboard (seamen and
officers) and ashore (cluster employment) per-
sonnel that are spent locally in Greece. Seafar-
ers aboard the merchant ships contribute their
income to domestic consumption through
remittances for their dependents in Greece.
Although the shipping companies based in
Greece are not taxed on profits and capital
2Since both imports and exports are made up of goods
and services, it would be clearer to say that the shipping
industry is Greece’s largest export of services but that down-
plays the fact that it contributes the most value in the export
column of Greece’s balance of trade.
Figure 2
gains, direct and indirect tax receipts based on
tonnage tax amounted to 5 percent of the
Greek government’s net budget proceeds in
2004 at €2.3 billion (Corres, p. 243).
The Greek shipping industry tax regime 
is one of the most favorable in the world. In
essence, the Greek Constitution guarantees the
right of capital mobility for shipping companies
in order to reduce the level of uncertainty
associated with shipping investments and
encourage Greek ship owners to repatriate their
capital into the domestic Greek economy. A
main provision in the current tax regime is
the enforcement of a tonnage tax (tax based
on carrying capacity of ships) in lieu of a tax
on profits for ships on the Greek shipping reg-
istry. By specifying ships in the Greek ship-
ping registry, this tax regime also applies to for-
eign shipping businesses that are based in
Greece, thus encouraging the development of
the Greek shipping cluster in Piraeus and other
major Greek ports. The taxable tonnage of the
vessel depends on its tonnage size group, and
the applicable tax rate corresponds with the age
of the vessel (“Choosing a Profitable Course . . .”).
All in all, the Greek government employs a
hands-off regulatory approach for the commer-
cial shipping sector, though coastal shipping
remains highly regulated through the cabotage
laws, which restrict the transport of goods and
passengers between two points in Greece by a
vessel registered in another country.3
Greek Fleet Modernization
Traditional Model of Operating
Secondhand Ships
In the post-war era, Greek ship owners
have profited from purchasing and operating
secondhand vessels, with the most famous
example being the acquisitions of U.S. Liberty
ships following World War II by Greek entrepre-
neurs such as Onassis, Colandris, and Naiarchos
(Elphick, p. 401). Entry into the shipping indus-
try has been eased by the availability of sec-
ondhand cargo ships in the market and the will-
ingness of Greek entrepreneurs to take risks.
This historical model of business continued
for decades alongside a culture of family-owned
ventures that kept Greek shipping companies
small and the industry diverse. About two-thirds
of the current Greek shipping entities own only
one to four ships each. Due to the dominant
business model of operating secondhand ships,
the Greek maritime fleet’s average age has
hovered above that of the world fleet, but instead
of considering the high age of its tonnage as a
weakness, Greek shipping companies actually
face lower fixed cost obligations. This cost
advantage is realized through lower payments
for recent purchases or no capital obligations
for the owners of old, fixed-cost free vessels
(Thanopoulou, p. 36).
Reasons for Fleet Modernization
Greek owners have traditionally done well
operating older ships, but following the turn
of the millennium, they sought to modernize
their fleet. One main reason for fleet modern-
ization is the advent of “quality shipping” fol-
lowing the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, along
with the subsequent passage of environmental
regulations outlining ship specifications. Pas-
sage of the 1990 U.S. Oil Pollution Act was fol-
lowed by similar measures in the international
arena with the swift 1992 adoption of amend-
ments 13G and 13F to MARPOL4 (Thanopoulou,
p. 39). New ship construction specifications and
a timetable for ship retirement were set in addi-
tion to the requirement of compulsory certifi-
cation for management procedures onboard ves-
sels and ashore (Thanopoulou, p. 39). Though
the wave of new regulations affected shipping
companies worldwide, Greek-controlled ship-
ping was hit especially hard because of its
preference for old tonnage.
Throughout the past two decades, Greek
ship owners have made substantial efforts to
modernize their fleets either through new
buildings or secondhand acquisitions of newer
ships. In regards to secondhand acquisitions,
Greek ship owners used their experience in tim-
ing transactions to modernize their fleets by
acquiring ships when the prices were depressed
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4MARPOL, an acronym for “marine pollution,” reg-
ulated through the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution from Ships, covers shipping pollu-
tion from both operational and accidental causes. 
3Since our focus is commercial shipping which deals
mainly in the international arena, the cabotage law and
the intricacies of coastal shipping in Greece will not be cov-
ered within this paper.
in the late 1990s, and by restraining their
participation when markets started their ascent
in 2003 (Thanopoulou, p. 44). The astute par-
ticipation in the secondhand market by the
Greek ship owners is reflected in a snapshot
of the market in the early months of 2006 when
the average age of Greek secondhand purchases
was calculated to be 9 years while the average
age of all ships sold was 15 years (Thanopoulou,
p. 44). The cumulative effect of this strat-
egy is apparent in the latest data provided by 
Murphy in 2011: the Greek-controlled fleet
average ship age is currently 1.8 years below
that of the world fleet, standing at 11 years,
down from 20.3 years in 2000.
Another factor that encouraged Greek fleet
modernization was the favorable financial con-
ditions during the first decade of the twenty-first
century. Banks, awash with liquidity and look-
ing for higher returns, saw the shipping compa-
nies as attractive additions to their loan portfo-
lios. At the same time, increased demand for
shipping services worldwide led to higher ship-
ping rates, which not only gave Greek shipping
companies an influx of cash flow but also encour-
aged further expansion of their fleet capacities.
Increasingly high secondhand prices coupled
with a low interest rate environment led to
new building orders, which also outpaced the
rate of scrapping for old ships, thereby further
speeding up the Greek fleet modernization.
Role of Ship Finance in Greek
Shipping Operation
Overview of Ship Finance
Shipping is a capital-intensive industry
wherein external financing is essential to the
purchase of vessels. External finance is not lim-
ited to delivery of new buildings, for many
leases and purchases in the secondhand ship
market also require finance. In other words, any
shortage of ship finance affects the markets
in both new and used tonnage. Typically, ship-
builders sell their new buildings directly, while
ship brokers handle sales of secondhand 
vessels (Frankel, p. 133). Owing to the volatile
nature of the shipping business, especially
the spot market for freight rates,5 investment
decisions in the shipping industry are burdened
with a significant element of uncertainty. Greek
shipping companies raise funds for the 
purchase of ships through a variety of ways,
including a combination of bank lending, pri-
vate placements,6 public issues of equity and
bonds,7 commercial paper, and securitizations8
(Syriopoulos, p. 173). 
In the past few years, both domestic Greek
banks and international banks have favored
the financing of newer tonnage, which encour-
aged the modernization of the Greek fleet.
According to Petrofin Bank Research, loans
from around the globe made available to Greek
shipping companies rose by an annual average
of 23.7 percent between 2001 and 2008 to a total
of $73.23 billion. There are three main types
of financing supplied by the banks: the standard
ship mortgage loan, fixed interest credit for new
buildings advanced on the behalf of the ship-
builder by a bank with the backing of a state
guarantee (mainly done by Chinese shipbuilders
through Chinese banks), and lease or bare
boat/hire-purchase agreements (Syriopoulos, 
p. 174).
Effects from the Greek Sovereign
Debt Crisis
Before the financial crisis, Greek shipping
companies used to be seen as attractive invest-
ments for banks in a way analogous to home
mortgage lending. Ship purchases involve inten-
sive capital tie-ups because of the large initial
cost, but as with home financing, ships serve
as stable underlying assets that could provide
banks with a steady stream of income from
the ship owners’ loan repayments. However, the
banking and economic crises that began in 2008
have led to restrictions on new lending. The
resulting global fund shortage hit the Greek
shipping industry particularly hard because of
its growing reliance on external ship finance
(Petropoulos, June 1, 2011).
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5A freight rate is the cost of delivery for a specific
cargo.
6A private placement refers to securities sold without
public offering to select investors. 
7This is simply the opposite of a private placement
whereby equities and securities may be offered to the
public. The distinction between a private placement and a
public offering is important mainly to securities regula-
tion and the liquidity of their secondary markets.
8Securitization refers to the use of a stream of income
and/or portfolio assets to back the issue of securities.
The Greek economic crisis has impeded
Greek ship owners from securing finance
through domestic banks for both new buildings
and secondhand acquisitions, which accounts
for 23.98 percent of the total exposure of the
global banking sector to Greek shipping
(Petropoulos, June 1, 2011). The decrease in
bank lending was a symptom of the deleverag-
ing process undergone by banks, which was
driven by the lack of funding following the
collapse of the interbank lending market. At the
same time, freight rates fell because of an excess
in tonnage due to over-ordering in the heyday
of the period ending around 2008. By compar-
ison, the Baltic Dry Index9 currently hovers
around 2,000 points, which is 85 percent lower
than the record high of 11,793 points on May
20, 2008.
The financial crisis notwithstanding,
investment decisions in the shipping industry
must account for high degrees of uncertainty.
For one, the derived nature of demand makes
the shipping industry directly susceptible to
movements in the global business cycle; in other
words, the shipping industry declines during a
recession because of the contraction in trade but
is in high demand during periods of economic
and trade growth. In the first instance, with
intensive capital resources tied up in leases and
purchases of vessels, a fall in the demand for
shipping services impedes a company’s ability
to make loan or lease payments, thereby increas-
ing the company’s liabilities. Ultimately, the
company becomes insolvent if the value of assets
does not cover liabilities plus equities. Because
ships depreciate rapidly, companies that must
use them as a primary form of collateral are
highly susceptible to the vagaries of the market
and changes in revenue streams. Moreover,
the current oversupply of tonnage is also forc-
ing down the prices of secondhand vessels, mak-
ing it particularly difficult for ship owners to be
as flexible with their financial planning as
they were when the financial market was work-
ing in their favor pre-crisis.
Throughout the recent financial condi-
tions, only the largest public and private ship
owners have managed to secure ship finance
because they provide more security than the
smaller shipping companies can muster. For the
most part, larger shipping companies have more
resources, higher levels of transparency, and
greater management depth than do smaller
firms, which make them more attractive to
banks. Moreover, medium-sized and large Greek
shipping companies are mostly in good finan-
cial shape and are not overly in debt to the
banks, owing to the restraint they exercised dur-
ing the boom years (“What’s in Store for 2012”).
Smaller ship owners, on the other hand, face
loan margins10 that are double what they were
before the crisis, in addition to stricter financ-
ing terms (Petropoulos, June 1, 2011). For
example, New York-listed Omega Navigation had
to file for bankruptcy in mid-2011 because the
Greek ship owner had trouble negotiating a res-
olution with banks to repair its balance sheet,
which had a market capitalization of about $3
million but close to $300 million in debt
(“Omega Filing Stokes Row about Banks”). Such
problems are not limited only to Greeks since
non-Greek shipping giants also face cash flow
issues in the tightening market.
Effects from the Global Financial
Crisis
As noted previously, the shipping industry
is very dependent on the conditions of the global
market, with one result being that the larger
European debt crisis is having a tremendous mul-
tiplier effect on ship finance. Due to sovereign
risk factors, banks are required by the Basel III
Accord to increase their capital adequacy ratio11
on top of their daily battle to maintain liquid-
ity, which has been hampered by a virtual halt
in interbank lending in Europe. Because of this
development, European banks are more likely to
utilize their loan portfolio runoffs to shore up
their liquidity instead of providing more loans
(“The Retreat From Everywhere . . .”). An esti-
mate by Petrofin Research indicates that Euro-
pean banks provide about 82 percent of global
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10A loan margin is the fixed portion of your loan
rate that, when added to the index (base-line) rate, equals
your full interest rate.
11The capital adequacy ratio measures a bank’s risk-
weighted credit exposures.
9The Baltic Dry Index tracks international shipping
rates for various dry bulk cargoes by measuring average
rates in the short-term spot market for chartering ships
to carry iron ore, coal, and other bulk commodities.
shipping loans, which means that ship owners
around the world, including Greek ship own-
ers, currently face slower lending from banks
(Petropoulos, December 15, 2011).
Perspectives on Long-Term
Competitiveness
Prospects for Large Ship Owners
Under these difficult circumstances, Greek
ship owners have turned to non-European
banks to keep financial commitments and
remain competitive as they modernize their
fleets. One current major ally of the Greek ship-
ping industry is the Chinese banking sector;
banks such as China Development Bank (CDB),
Bank of China, Export Import Bank of China
(EXIM), and China Construction Bank (CCB)
continue to finance the construction of ships
with Greek interests at Chinese shipyards.
Because European banks have been reluctant to
lend, the presence of Chinese lenders in the field
of ship financing is not surprising, especially
since orders of new buildings at Chinese ship-
yards stood at 2,876 vessels in September 2011,
which accounts for 44 percent of ship construc-
tion around the world (Bardounias). Since 2000,
Greek ship owners have ordered nearly 500 ves-
sels from Chinese shipyards. The latest Lloyd’s-
Fairplay figures indicate that, as of March 2011,
Greek-controlled shipping companies have
621 vessels on order from shipyards around the
world.
The main tool used to finance the Greek
shipping industry by Chinese banks is a $10
billion fund set up by the Chinese government
in Beijing to back Greek orders at Chinese
shipyards with competitive terms and interest
rates (Bardounias). Some large Greek ship
owners are taking advantage of this loan facil-
ity. In February 2012, DryShips obtained a
$122.58 million loan from a syndicate of Chi-
nese banks to finance the purchase of a trio of
206,000-dwt bulkers under construction at
Shanghai Jiangnan-Changxing for delivery
in 2013 and 2014 (“DryShips Wraps Up First
All-Chinese . . .”). Lomar Corporation, which
already has a fleet of 35 ships, announced in
March 2012 an order of six containerships
from Guangzhou Wenchong Shipyard in
China due for delivery in early 2014 (“Lomar
Back In . . .”). It appears that at least a few
of the larger Greek firms have been successful
in funding the purchase of new tonnage to
remain competitive.
Small and Medium-Sized Ship
Owners
Small ship owners face a different set of
challenges. Owners of one to four ships are
less likely than large firms to buy new vessels.
Instead, most of their ships are secondhand and
generally require less capital expenditure than
new buildings. However, that does not mean
that the small ship owners are forgoing ship
finance altogether; the purchase of even a sec-
ondhand ship is still a serious capital undertak-
ing that generally requires external financing.
The role of banks as financial intermediaries
is as crucial as it is with the larger shipping
companies, but banks favor larger, and presum-
ably safer, clients in a tight financial market.
Furthermore, since secondhand vessels do not
come directly from Asian shipyards, small ship
owners lack access to Asian lenders, who are
more willing than European banks to extend
loans to smaller shipping firms. 
Economically, it would make sense for
small shipping companies to merge, thereby
combining resources and expertise. Such
economies of scale would help reduce costs,
attain higher efficiency, and gain market share.
Presumably, consolidation would provide newly
enlarged shipping companies with ready access
to chartering, contracting, and hedging oppor-
tunities (Thanopoulou, p. 49). Unfortunately,
despite the obvious potential advantages of con-
solidation, without access to ship finance,
even medium-sized owners with mid-aged units
could not update their fleets, which would force
them to rely on older vessels. Also, consolida-
tions involving companies that wish to buy
out smaller, less-efficient firms would require
cash and/or equity and therefore some degree
of capital financing. Banks unable to provide
financing for what would normally be consid-
ered safe new-ship construction investments are
unlikely to finance riskier mergers and acquisi-
tions ventures. Thus, it is possible that small
owners unable to adapt to the tight financial cli-
mate may be forced out of business entirely
(Zolotas).
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The facts speak for themselves: over the
past 50 years, small firms have accounted for
at least 60 percent of all Greek shipping compa-
nies through the industry’s peaks and valleys,
thus indicating that the Greek fleet has been
consistently comprised of a large number of
companies. Worries of consolidation during bust
periods have always been alleviated when the
shipping industry returns to boom periods. The
continued diversity of the Greek shipping indus-
try has been attributed to the entrepreneurial
philosophy of ship owners and their adher-
ence to the family business structure, accompa-
nied by expert usage of networks to decrease
transaction costs and increase competitiveness.
In fact, Greek shipping companies are known to
participate in multiple networks, some loose and
some tight, across all company sizes, related
through both horizontal and vertical linkages
(Theotokas, p. 81). Networking allows the Greek
shipping community to realize several advan-
tages such as external economies, information
sharing, cost reduction, and diffusion of tacit
knowledge (Theotokas, pp. 83–84).
Taxing the Shipping Industry
Taxation in the Greek shipping industry
affects both the competitiveness of Greek ship-
ping and the economic solvency of Greece itself.
Analysts have suggested that one possible
response to the Greek debt crisis would be to
increase taxes on the shipping industry to
increase revenue. This article has already out-
lined how shipping companies in Greece bene-
fit from a constitutionally protected status that
exempts operating income and capital gains
from taxation, so the question being asked
now is whether or not Greece deserves a greater
payback from the shipping industry in light of
Greece’s unprecedented financial crisis (“Has the
Time Come to Tax Ship Owners?”). Even though
shipping is already Greece’s second-largest
earner of foreign income after tourism, a case
can be made that, given the significant share
of the global shipping sector held by Greek com-
panies, their contribution to the Greek economy
should be higher than it is at present. In par-
ticular, receipts to the economy per gross ton-
nage amounted to only $150, which is just
one-third of the corresponding average for the
largest maritime countries (“Greek Shipping is
Modernized”). One reason for this ostensible dis-
juncture is that, unlike other larger maritime
nations, the volume of seaborne trade moving
through Greek ports is miniscule because Greece
is not a major exporting/importing country.
From the Greek ship owners’ point of view,
the current tax regime for the Greek shipping
registry is a competitive advantage, as the guar-
anteed right of capital mobility for shipping
companies reduces the level of uncertainty asso-
ciated with shipping investments. In fact, it is
the constitutionally-protected tax exemption
that encouraged repatriation of capital as well
as relocation of the Greek shipping compa-
nies’ headquarters from places like New York
and London to Piraeus, a port city just outside
of Athens. An attempt to tax the income of Greek
ship owners directly would most likely drive
them offshore. With ships as their main assets
and the assumed ease of establishing subsidiary
offices in other countries, it would not take long
for shipping companies to move their operations
away from Greece, especially for the larger firms
that control more than half the deadweight ton-
nage in the Greek fleet. Indeed, when the United
Kingdom introduced in 2008 an annual £30,000
charge on long-term residents who claimed
non-domicile status, up to 30 percent of the
non-domiciled Greek shipping operations sub-
sequently left the country (“Baltic Boss Blasts
‘Non-dom’ Moves”).
Interim Prime Minister Lucas Papademos
has reiterated the stance of previous adminis-
trations in ruling out changes to the current tax
status for Greek shipping companies, even with
the threat of a looming default on sovereign
debt. This action is consistent with the goal of
the Greek state to keep healthy and coopera-
tive relations with ship owners so as to sup-
port the competitiveness of shipping. In addi-
tion to the favorable tonnage tax regime, the
Greek government employs a hands-off regu-
latory approach which has allowed Greek ship
owners to be flexible in adapting to the needs
and requirements of the constantly changing
global environment. Thus, Greek ship owners,
generally unencumbered by nationalistic and
protectionist policies, are better able to han-
dle the shipping industry’s unpredictable cycles
than they might otherwise were they forced to
operate within a more extensive regulatory
framework (Theotokas and Harlaftis, p. 100).
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Conclusion
The shipping industry worldwide was 
hit hard during the recent recession by a 
combination of slowdowns in trade, associated 
reductions in freight rates, and the subse-
quent lack of liquidity available from Euro-
pean banks, resulting in more stringent lending 
policies that impeded fleet modernization and 
consolidation efforts. Despite these difficult con-
ditions, the Greek shipping industry has been 
able to respond, first by working with the gov-
ernment to avoid alteration of the beneficial tax 
structure, and second by judicious international 
borrowing, most notably from the Chinese 
banking/ship building consortia, to finance fleet 
modernization and diversification. In placing 
new orders, many large ship owners have moved 
into acquisitions of containerships, liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) carriers, dynamically posi-
tioned drill ships, and shuttle tankers (Murphy). 
The move into the container sector is notable, 
given Greek ship owners’ historic specialization 
in dry bulk tonnage. The diversification into the 
offshore oil-drilling sector, however, is indica-
tive of the Greeks’ opportunistic traits since 
oil prices have consistently remained high. 
Greek ship owners have been bold and 
responsive in the effort to remain competitive as 
the global shipping industry slowly recovers 
from the recession. In the past, Greek shippers 
have managed to emerge from recessions even 
more strongly positioned than they had been 
before the downturns, so it is not implausible, 
given the fleet modernization and diversification 
efforts described above, that they will be equally 
successful this time around. While the global 
financial crisis has diminished the liquidity avail-
able for ship finance, Greek ship owners have 
been able to maintain their leadership in total 
tonnage among the world’s fleets through their 
timeless “buy low, sell high” strategy. The ship-
ping industry plays a significant role in the Greek 
economy, and it will be important to avoid 
impulsive changes in taxation policy because the 
potential economic downside for shipping is too 
great a risk for the modest tax returns that might 
be gained. It is especially crucial for the shipping 
industry in Greece to maintain its competitive-
ness as it navigates through this financial storm, 
both for its own financial well-being and for its 
contribution to the overall economic stability of 
Greece.
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